As the profiles of state attorneys general have risen in recent decades, so have legislative efforts to constrain their powers. In many states, these efforts have taken on the characteristics of constitutional hardball, with legislative actors pursuing legal, although frequently unsavory, means to preserve and entrench their interests in the face of shifting political and legal tides. When adjudicating these “power plays,” state courts have been forced to confront the question of how to approach the attorney general’s common law powers—a pre-colonial legacy of the office that may have major implications for how legislative efforts to control and constrain attorneys general are ultimately resolved. This Note details the history, scope, and varied approaches states have taken to these powers before examining how these approaches have informed state court decisions on the balance of power between legislatures and attorneys general in Wisconsin and North Carolina. Given the rising profile of state attorneys general and their (frequent) status as democratically elected statewide officials, this Note argues for the robust “constitutionalization” of the office’s common law powers, thereby insulating them from legislative interference and creating a principled counterweight to constitutional hardball.