In this essay, Professors Dana and Tuerkheimer conceptualize Flint as an archetypical case of underenforcement—that is, a denial of the equal protection of laws guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Viewed as such, the inadequacy of environmental regulation can be understood as a failure that extends beyond the confines of Flint; a failure that demands a far more expansive duty to protect vulnerable populations.
Take a listen to our conversation with BYU Law Professor Aaron Nielson on his recent administrative law scholarship.
Want to know what the Supreme Court might look like in a Trump Administration? We've got you covered. Take a look at our curated list of opinions written by his nominees.
In this essay, Litman and Rahman argue that if the Supreme Court grants habeas relief in this month’s Beckles v. United States, then it should spell out certain details about where a Beckles claim comes from and who such a claim benefits. Those details are not essential to the main question raised in the case, but the federal habeas statute takes away the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to hear just about any case that would raise those questions. For that reason, Litman and Rahman conclude that failing to address those questions now could arbitrarily condemn hundreds of prisoners to illegal sentences and lead to a situation where the habeas statute is unconstitutional.